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Taxpayers Stripped of Clothing Deductions
by an Objective Standard

In Pevsner v. Commissioner," the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that the purchase price of expensive designer clothing was not deductible
as an "ordinary and necessary" business expense of a boutique manager,
even though the clothing was to be worn only at the boutique. With this
holding, the court adopted an objective standard for determining adaptability of work clothing to general use.
Ms. Sandra Pevsner was the manager of a boutique that sold only women's clothes and accessories designed by Yves St. Laurent (YSL).2 The
apparel was very expensive, and Pevsner was required by her employer to
purchase and wear the clothing,8 primarily to promote sales of the clothing.' During 1975, Pevsner bought several items of clothing, 5 for which
she paid approximately $1380.1 On her 1975 tax return she deducted a
portion of that amount.' When the Commissioner denied the deduction,
Pevsner petitioned the Tax Court seeking deduction of the full $1380.8
The Tax Court allowed the deduction9 as an ordinary and necessary business expense.10 The Commissioner appealed that ruling and the Fifth Circuit reversed."
The crucial issue in Pevsner was, of course, whether the expenses for
the YSL clothing were to be treated, for tax purposes, as business ex1. 628 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1980).
2. Id. at 468.
3. Id. at 468-69.
4. Id.
5. The items included: four blouses, three skirts, one pair of slacks, one trench coat, two
sweaters, one jacket, one tunic, five scarves, six belts, two pairs of shoes and four necklaces.
628 F.2d at 429. For various reasons, Ma. Pevaner did not wear the clothing during off-work
hours. Her husband was partially disabled because of a severe heart attack in 1971. They led
a simple life with very limited and informal social activities. Pevsner stated that the clothes
were too expensive for her simple everyday lifestyle. In addition, she did not wear the
clothes apart from work so they would last longer. Id.
6. 628 F.2d at 429.
7. Id.
8. Pevsner v. Commissioner, 38 T.C.M. 1210, rev'd, 628 F.2d 467 (1980).
9. 38 T.C.M. at 1213.
10. Id. at 1212. The Tax Court apparently felt that its earlier ruling in Yeomans v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 757 (1958) was categorically dispositive of Peusner.
11. 628 F.2d at 471.
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penses or personal expenses. The former characterization of the expenses
would enable Pevsner to claim the purchase costs as a deduction,"" while
characterization as the latter would disallow any deduction."3
Clothing costs have generally been considered nondeductible personal
expenses." Courts have also denied a deduction for the cost of clothes
even when it was shown that the clothes would not have been purchased
"but for" the employment," or when the clothes used at work were more
expensive than everyday apparel."6 However, deductions have
been al7
lowed for the cost of clothing useful only in the workplace.
A three-pronged test is used to determine whether clothing expenses
may be deducted as an ordinary and necessary business expense. First,
the clothing must be required in the taxpayer's employment. Second, the
clothing must not be suitable for general or personal wear. Finally, the
clothing must not actually be worn for general or personal wear." This
test was used by both the Tax Court and the Fifth Circuit in Pevsner."
The Tax Court, however, allowed the clothing costs as a deduction" while
s
the Fifth Circuit did not. "
The Commissioner conceded that Ms. Pevsner was required by her employer to wear YSL clothing and that she did not wear the apparel away
from work. 2 Since the first and third prongs of the test were satisfied by
the Commissioner's stipulation, the only remaining issue was whether the
clothing was adaptable to general usage as ordinary clothing.'8 However,
courts have had much difficulty in implementing this phase of the threestep analysis.2" The Tax Court has sometimes determined adaptability by
looking to the personal lifestyle of the individual taxpayer under consid12. I.R.C. § 162 (business deductions).
13. I.R.C. § 262 (personal expenses).
14. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Commissioner, 39 T.C.M. (P-H) 70,058 (1970), affd, 451 F.2d
1023 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 920 (1972).
15. See, e.g., Stiner v. United States, 524 F.2d 640 (10th Cir. 1975).
16. Drill v. Commissioner, 8 T.C. 902 (1947).

17. Mortrud v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 208 (1965); Harsaghy v. Commissioner, 2 T.C. 484
(1943); Meier v. Commissioner 2 T.C. 458 (1943).
18. Donnelly v. Commissioner, 262 F.2d 411, 412 (2d Cir. 1959).
19. 38 T.C.M. at 1212; 628 F.2d at 469.
20. 38 T.C.M. at 1213.
21. 628 F.2d at 471.
22. Id. at 469-70.
23. Id. at 470.
24. This generalization does not apply to situations in which the taxpayer has purchased
uniforms for work. it is fairly well-settled that the cost of a uniform is deductible as an
ordinary and necessary business expense. See Commissioner v. Benson, 146 F.2d 191 (9th
Cir. 1944); Meier v. Commissioner, 2 T.C. 458 (1943); Harsaghy v. Commissioner, 2 T.C. 484
(1943). The confusion in determining adaptability has arisen primarily when ordinary street
clothing was bought for use at the workplace.
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eration.2" At other times, the Tax Court, along with other tribunals, has
simply made an objective determination of whether the clothing was
26
adaptable.

In Yeomans v. Commissioner, 7 the Tax Court applied a subjective test
for determining the adaptability of clothing. The taxpayer was a fashion
coordinator for her employer. As part of her job, she was required to attend many meetings on behalf of her employer. It was customary for
those in attendance at these meetings to dress according to the most advanced styles. To dress otherwise would have reflected unfavorably upon
her employer. For her personal wear, however, the taxpayer preferred
plainer, more conservative dress. The Tax Court, in considering the question of adaptability to personal use, recognized that the relevant clothing
"dwas new and ultra in style and design, and was such as might be sought
after and worn for personal use by women who make it a practice to
dress according to the most advanced or extreme fashions."2 8 The court
also noted that some of the items worn by the taxayer were "items which
were not suited for her private or personal wear, as distinguished from
business wear. .

. ."9

Consequently, the court held that the expenses for

the described clothing were allowable as an "ordinary and necessary" business expense deduction. 0
Over the years, however, the Tax Court has experienced problems when
attempting to apply the subjective standard illustrated in Yeomans. One
problem has been that the Tax Court has not used consistent language
when addressing the question of adaptability from a subjective perspective. For example, at least one Tax Court case enunciated the test by
stating that the clothing must not be suitable for personal use.8 ' Another
decision stated that the clothing must not be suitable for general or personal use. 2 Still another case announced the standard as being whether
the clothing is adaptable to general usage as ordinary clothingss The
semantic variations, although not grossly disparate, are still enough to
25. Sharon v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 515 (1976); Yeomans v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 757
(1958); Fisher v. Commissioner, 23 T.C. 218 (1954).
26. Donnelly v. Commissioner, 262 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1959); Roth v. Commissioner, 17
T.C. 1450 (1952); Drill v. Commissioner, 8 T.C. 902 (1947).
27. 30 T.C. 757 (1958).
28. Id. at 768 (emphasis added).
29. Id. (emphasis added). The court seemed to be looking at Yeomans' personal need for
the clothing rather than whether the clothing could be used for general use by an "objective" person.
30. Id.
31. Carroll v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 215 (1968).
32. Jackson v. Commissioner, 39 T.C.M. (P-H) 170,227 (1970).
33. Sanner v. Commissioner, 38 T.C.M. (P-H) 169,084 (1969).
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cast doubt on the exact standard being followed by the court.,
A second problem is that some Tax Court decisions which attempted to
judge adaptability from a subjective posture, made it virtually impossible
to discern the factors forming the basis of their conclusions. An illustration is one case in which the court stated that "where there is a mixture
of personal and business considerations" a balancing and weighing of all
facts is required so that they may be given proper importance.s8 In another case, the court stated that the question of adaptability is determined as follows:
when the item is one which might be used by some individual as ordinary
dress, and worn in lieu of other clothing, we must determine from the
facts if in fact the item was so connected with the taxpayers business as
to be a proper deduction for a business expense."
In essence, these applications of subjective analysis did not set forth 7the
specific factors considered vital to the determination of adaptability.
An alternative to the subjective method of deciding adaptability, as
used in Yeomans, is an objective approach. The Tax Court used this approach in Drill v.Commissioner." In Drill, the taxpayer was employed as
an outside superintendent and utility man for a general contractor. Since
the taxpayer's work was hazardous at times, his clothing was often soiled
with plaster, cement, oil or grease, and was sometimes torn or snagged.
On the adaptability question, the court held that the clothing was of a
kind adaptable to be worn generally, away from work as well as at work,
even though "as a matter of personal taste he would not want to wear it
in social pursuits."'3
Donnelly v. Commissioner0 represents another case in which the objective standard for determining adaptability was applied. In Donelly, the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a Tax Court finding that the
clothing in question was adaptable to general usage. " The taxpayer was
34. Indeed, under the separate wordings expressed in these three cases, it is difficult to
determine whether the test is one of individual general usage or objective general usage. The
different wording may simply be due to the fact that the Tax Court, having 13 judges, often
makes its decisions in panels. Therefore, having no en banc decision to use for guidance,
each panel simply used its own wording. Regardless of the reason for the language variation,
the resulting confusion was the same.
35. Sharon v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 515 (1976) (emphasis added).
36. Fryer v. Commissioner, 43 T.C.M. (P-H) 174,077 (1974) (emphasis added).
37. Id. Although the vague considerations mentioned in some cases are confusing, some
courts simply state conclusions without revealing any factors on which their conclusions
rest. See, e.g., Mortrud v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 208 (1965).
38. 8 T.C. 902 (1947).
39. Id. at 904 (emphasis added).
40. 28 T.C. 1278, af'd, 262 F.2d 411 (1959).
41. 262 F.2d at 412.
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employed in a plastics plant. His work was hard on clothes and he wore
heavy-duty work clothes while on the job. The court determined that the
work clothes were adaptable to wear away from work, even though the
clothing was worn out prematurely by the process and the rough materials used in the taxpayer's work."'
For some time, then, two different standards existed for determining
adaptability of work clothing to general usage, one subjective and the
other objective. In Pevsner, the court of appeals was confronted with the
question of which standard to adopt. Prior to deciding this issue, the
Fifth Circuit reviewed the Tax Court's treatment of Pevsner. The Tax
Court felt that the second prong qualification of "suitable for general or
personal wear" was to be judged subjectively, in light of the taxpayer's
personal lifestyle." Pevsner's clothing expenses were classified as deductible by the Tax Court because that court apparently felt the wearing of
YSL apparel during off-work hours would be inconsistent with Ms. Pevsner's lifestyle." Probing for the reasoning of the Tax Court, the court of
appeals noted that the basis had been heavy reliance on the earlier Tax
Court decision in Yeomans."
After reviewing the Tax Court's treatment of Pevsner, the Fifth Circuit
stated that other circuits which had addressed the question of clothing
adaptability had taken an objective rather than subjective approach."6 In
support of this statement, the court simply cited Donnelly and one other
7
appellate decision.'
Moreover, the Fifth Circuit asserted two basic reasons in support of an
objective test. The first of these was administrative convenience .' On this
point the court stated that:
[a]n objective test, although not perfect, provides a practical administra42. 28 T.C. at 1280. In a sharp dissent to the Second Circuit's decision, Judge Hand
argued that the deduction should be allowed and that disallowance of it was "an entirely
arbitrary and capricious" line to draw. 262 F.2d at 413. Judge Hand, however, did not specifically address the adaptability question.
43. 628 F.2d at 470.
44. Id.
45. Id. In fact, the appellate court extracted a passage from the Tax Court opinion which
stated that "Yeomans clearly decides the issue before us in favor of the petitioner." Id.
46. Id. Attempting to explain the objective approach, the court stated that "no reference
is made to the individual taxpayer's lifestyle or personal taste." Instead, proposed the court,
adaptability for personal use depended upon what was generally accepted for ordinary
streetwear. Id.
47. Id. The other appellate decision referred to by the court was Stiner v. United States,
524 F.2d 640 (10th Cir. 1975). The court also cited Drill v. Commissioner, 8 T.C. 902 (1947)
in support of this proposition. Only the appellate decisions, however, seem pertinent to this
proposition.
48. 628 F.2d at 470.

1326

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32

tive approach that allows a taxpayer or revenue agent to look only to
objective facts in determining whether clothing required as a condition of
employment is adaptable to general use as ordinary streetwear. Conversely, the tax court's reliance on subjective factors provides no concrete
guidelines in determining the deductibility of clothing purchased as a
condition of employment.'
The court apparently agreed with the Commissioner's contentions that:
(1) as a practical matter, it is virtually impossible to determine the point
at which either price of style or clothing is inconsistent with a taxpayer's
lifestyle, and (2) the styles and prices of clothing one selects are inherently personal choices governed by taste, fashion and other unmeasurable
values.50
A second reason advanced by the court to support an objective standard was that this test would "promote substantial fairness among the
greatest number of taxpayers."51 The court, by assuming this position,
was apparently unwilling to subject two taxpayers with identical wardrobes to disparate tax consequences depending on the particular taxpayer's lifestyle and "socio-economic level.'8 Such a result, the Fifth Circuit stated, was not "consonant with a resonable interpretation of
sections 162 and 262" of the I.R.C."
The objective test adopted by the Fifth Circuit can obviously lead to
harsh results on individual taxpayers, as is reflected in Pevsner. Indeed, if
anyone deserved a deduction for work clothing, Ms. Pevsner was that person. She clearly had no use for the YSL clothing required by her employer. Her husband's partial disability virtually guaranteed that her
lifestyle was, and would continue to be, simple with a very limited and
informal social calendar. In fact, a deduction for Ms. Pevsner would be
more justified than the deduction allowed by the Tax Court in Yeomans.
In that case, the taxpayer simply preferred a plainer style of dress." In
Pevsner, however, the taxpayer's off-work style of dress was seemingly
dictated to her by extrinsic factors, regardless of her personal preference.
Although Ms. Pevsner had a plausible argument that her YSL clothing
was not adaptable based on the rationale of Yeomans,"5 the Fifth Circuit,
by opting for an objective test, chose the most practical means of deterlining adaptability of clothing. The administrative convenience justifica-

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
cence

Id.
Id.
Id. at 471.
Id.
Id. at 471.
30 T.C. at 760.
The argument seemed particularly strong in light of the Commissioner's acquiesin the Yeomans decision. 1959-1 C.B. 5.
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tion proffered by the court was its most sound argument." In adopting
the objective standard, the appellate court avoided the problems that had
plagued the Tax Court when it had attempted to apply the subjective
test.17 Furthermore, by electing the objective standard, the court foreclosed the propsect of obtaining judicial sanction in the Fifth Circuit of a
deduction for work clothing; at least when the deduction turns on adaptability of the clothing to general usage.
THOMAS DANIEL BRANNAN

56. 628 F.2d at 470. See Donnelly v. Commissioner, 262 F.2d 411, 412 (2d Cir. 1959).
Although the statement that other circuits had adopted an objective standard may be true,
it is not enough, standing alone, to support the adoption of an objective test by the Fifth
Circuit. In fact, one of the circuit cases on which the court in Pevsner relied did very little
to support the proposition. See Stiner v. United States, 524 F.2d 640 (10th Cir. 1975).
57. See notes 32-38 supra, and accompanying text for illustrations of the various
problems encountered by the Tax Court.

